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FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2573  
INFO RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0132  
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1814  
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY  
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY  
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC PRIORITY  
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY  
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY  
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY  
RHMFIUU/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC//OSAC PRIORITY

UNCLAS THE HAGUE 000129

SENSITIVE  
SIPDIS

STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCA, L/NPV, IO/MPR,  
SECDEF FOR OSD/GSA/CN, CP>  
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC  
COMMERCE FOR BIS (ROBERTS AND DENYER)  
NSC FOR FLY  
WINPAC FOR WALTER

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: PARM PREL CWC I2

SUBJECT: CWC: MEETINGS ON IRAQ'S ACCESSION TO THE CWC ON  
THE MARGINS OF EC-55 (FEBRUARY 17-20, 2009)

REF: A. THE HAGUE 000104  
1B. STATE 11851  
1C. THE HAGUE 000071

(U) This is CWC-10-09.

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SUMMARY  
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11. (SBU) On the margins of the 55th Executive Council (EC) session of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), Delreps met with representatives of Iraq, the United Kingdom, and the Technical Secretariat. Although the tone of EC-55 toward Iraq was congratulatory, Iraqi officials in The Hague seem to have come away from the Council session with a clear understanding of the complexity of Council business and the difficulties Iraq is likely to encounter following submission of its initial declaration. The Technical Secretariat (TS) is now taking a more active role in explaining Iraq's Chemical Weapons Convention obligations, particularly regarding chemical weapons declarations, inspections, and destruction. However, senior TS leadership still seems reluctant to engage more fully with Iraq, lest the OPCW be seen as giving Iraq preferential treatment.

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MEETING WITH THE UK  
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12. (SBU) On February 16, Delreps met with the UK delegation to discuss the status of Iraq's accession and the U.S. and UK declarations of rounds recovered in Iraq that will follow Iraq's own declaration. Both delegations briefly discussed total numbers of rounds recovered to date, and strategies for presenting this information to the OPCW. U.S. Delreps also gave an update on interactions with the Iraqi Embassy in

The Hague and information received from U.S.  
Embassy Baghdad.

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MEETINGS WITH IRAQI DIPLOMATS  
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¶13. (SBU) Delreps Clagett, Ferguson, Robinson, and Rodjom met with Iraqi Ambassador Siemand Banaa on February 17 to follow up on earlier discussions where detailed information on upcoming issues related to Iraq's accession and future EC interactions was provided (REF A). Ambassador Banaa had no questions on the material provided previously, and indicated that he had not had time to review it thoroughly. He did, however, note that he expected the number of recovered rounds to be much higher. He provided no insight as to when Iraq's declaration would be submitted, but recognized that its on-schedule submission (by March 14, 2009) would require an appropriate response at EC-56 (April 21-24, 2009) supported by Iraqi experts. Delreps agreed to support the need for participation from Baghdad, and to provide suggestions to him as to appropriate attendees.

¶14. (SBU) Banaa requested that the U.S. ask Embassy Baghdad to make the case with the Iraqi Government for augmenting the Ambassador's staff to assist with increasing OPCW activities. He also offered his opinion on several issues, including Iraq's continuing need for training support; Iraq's intent

to become active in OPCW affairs; his expectation that more chemical weapons will be recovered in the future based on his knowledge of the directives of the previous regime; and his personal support for prosecution of the companies that supplied items to support the CW program of the former regime.

¶15. (SBU) In a follow up meeting with Iraqi First Secretary Abbas Fadhil Al-Khafaji, Delreps Ferguson, Miller, and Robinson provided a copy of the most recent draft declaration received from Embassy Baghdad, and reviewed its classified and unclassified contents. They also discussed issues associated with future OPCW inspections, including the safety and security of inspectors. Abbas said that Ambassador Banaa had not given him the papers the U.S. had provided on February 12. Delreps also provided a table summarizing the immediate tasks ahead. Abbas thanked the U.S. for the information and advice, and acknowledged that there are likely to be a number of questions about Iraq's declaration. He therefore agreed that the presence of experts from Baghdad at EC-56 will be critical. Del will follow up with Abbas regarding the information provided, and to discuss Iraq's preparation for the EC-56 destruction informals presentation.

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MEETING WITH OPCW VERIFICATION DIVISION  
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¶16. (SBU) On February 17, Delreps Clagett, Ferguson, Robinson, and Rodjom met with Technical Secretariat representatives Dr. Horst Reeps (Director, Verification Division) and Dominique Anelli (Head, Chemical Demilitarization Branch) to discuss Iraq's progress in preparing and submitting its initial declaration; and participation of Iraqi experts in EC-56. Also present were Dr. Jim McGilly and Clive Rowland from the UK. Delreps provided a summary of recent interactions with Embassy Baghdad, and indicated that the U.S. had just received a copy of what U.S. experts thought was likely to be the final version of the Iraqi

declaration. NOTE: Del subsequently determined that the document received had been prepared in the December 2008 to February 2009 time frame, making it likely that this is the version destined for submission. END NOTE.

¶7. (SBU) Reeps made clear that the TS has taken the steps necessary to prepare for conducting initial inspections if they are not precluded by inspector safety and security issues. He indicated that if the GOI did not clearly state its inability to ensure inspector safety, it would be left to the Director General to make that determination. Reeps indicated that the TS would remain officially in "reaction mode" in terms of Iraqi assistance until the declaration is submitted. He added that DG Pfirter intends to avoid treating Iraq differently than any other new member state.

¶8. (SBU) Reeps also made several requests for the U.S. and UK to support Iraq in preparation for EC-56:

- that the USG or UK provide more current photographic documentation of the condition of the declared CW facilities (particularly the interior of declared CW facilities (particularly the interior of storage bunkers), in order to: aid in Iraq's EC-56 presentation; document the security situation; provide information for inspection planning; and possibly to provide a future

supplement or even alternative to inspections

- that the USG consider providing pre-briefings to TS inspectors on Iraqi conditions, e.g., no-go-locations, and

- that the USG press the GOI to provide the preparation and expert participants needed to present Iraq's initial declaration at the EC-56 destruction informals, and to answer any associated questions. TS reps suggested that Iraqi participants arrive in The Hague sufficiently in advance of EC-56 to ensure their adequate preparation and coordination with the TS and USG. Delreps offered to encourage officials in Baghdad to arrive the week prior to EC-56.

¶9. (SBU) Delreps reminded Reeps that USG operations in Iraq are now governed by the new Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and bi-lateral Security Agreement between Iraq and the USG that took effect January 1, 2009. Although the U.S. is amenable to providing appropriate support, future actions will be guided by GOI requests and coordination.

¶10. (SBU) U.S. and UK reps also informed the TS of their respective current totals of Iraqi chemical weapons rounds recovered and destroyed. At the TS request, U.S. reps gave a brief overview of the information that will be contained in the U.S. supplemental declaration, and what other information the U.S. has retained as back-up verification data. Reeps was noncommittal as to whether or not this type of information would be considered sufficient for verification purposes.

¶11. (SBU) DEL COMMENT: Del recommends further discussions with the Secretariat on this topic, prior to U.S. submission of its supplemental declaration. If other delegations have questions about whether the U.S. acted in accordance with the Chemical Weapons Convention, it will be important for the TS to be able to confirm that it is satisfied the rounds were destroyed in accordance with CWC requirements. END COMMENT.

**¶12. (U) Beik sends  
GALLAGHER**